


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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE: A CONCEPT
WHOSE TIME MAY HAVE COME AGAIN

by

Colonel William G. Hanne

25 May 1982

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
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FOREWORD

This special report notes those characteristics of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which critics have stated are the key driving factors behind their calls for reform. Key among those characteristics is the apparent inability of the JCS to render sound relevant military advice to the National Command Authority. The author contends that during World War II and for a short period of time thereafter, the JCS was highly regarded for its advice on military strategy and affairs. The principal council which provided a counterbalance to the advice generated from the Services was the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC). The author then traces the gradual decline of the JSSC and the concurrent growth of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, which, under subsequent reorganization became known as the J5. The author asserts that with the current legislative mood, coupled with the stated desires of General Jones (Chairman, JCS) and General Meyer (Chief of Staff, Army) to reorganize the JCS, a relook at the JSSC is in order. The author also believes that a rebirth of the JSSC would permit sound professional military advice to be rendered to the President, military advice that would be predicated on the capabilities and the needs of the nation and its joint military forces, not on Service bias or perceived requirements.

This special report was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the Army War College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



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COLONEL WILLIAM G. HANNE was assigned as a Strategic Research Analyst with the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute following his graduation from the US Naval War College in 1981. He has served in that position up to the present time. He is also a graduate of the US Army War College (DCS, 1980), the Army Command and General Staff College (1973), the US Military Academy (B.S., 1960), and the University of Illinois (M.S., 1968). Colonel Hanne has served in various command and staff assignments in the United States, Hawaii, Vietnam, and Germany. He was principal editor and co-author of the Landscape Atlas of the USSR and has had articles published in Military Intelligence, Military Review, and Parameters. His article "An Armed Forces Staff" will appear in Parameters, Vol. XII, No. 2, 1982.

SUMMARY

Virtually since 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been considered fair game for those with a desire to reorganize or reform the national military command structure of the United States. The chief characteristic of the JCS which has drawn the greatest amount of criticism has been the perceived inability of the JCS to render sound, relevant military advice to the President and to the National Security Council. The advice that is provided is perceived to be representative of either end of a spectrum--thoroughly reflective of Service bias or so compromised in an effort to represent the lowest common denominator among the Service Chiefs that the advice is without relevancy.

During World War II and for a period of time following the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, there was a body within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that was charged with providing advice on broad policy issues such as the relation of military and national strategy in light of developing situations and long-range possibilities, overall strategy, and military and politico-military policies. That body was a small group of three officers known as the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC). The JSSC was clearly the senior policy advisory group to the JCS during the period of World War II and up to about December 1950.

Beginning with the Korean War, the JSSC gradually declined in its span of responsibility and impact until July 1964 when it was disestablished by the JCS. Concurrent with the gradual demise of the JSSC was the growth and expansion of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, later to become the J5 under the directorate reorganization plan.

The need for sound military advice and recommendations has existed from the beginning. However, with the growth of the JCS/OJCS, there developed internal procedures, a lowest common denominator syndrome, and an interlocking relationship between the Service Staffs and the OJCS that appear to act as hindrances to the formulation and promulgation of sound military advice. The JSSC was able to promote such advice largely because it was composed of senior, experienced officers from all of the Services; they also had direct access to the necessary data and possessed the potential to arrive at an analysis and recommendation that were independent of Service bias or positions. The creation of a new JSSC at this time may serve to fulfill the needs of the National Command Authority, particularly if the principles noted are adhered to in the makeup and utilization of such a group.

A Military Advisory Council (MAC), composed of a senior officer at the four-star level from each Service, serving his terminal assignment prior to retirement without a dual-hatted commitment, would be such an organization. The MAC would have access to the JCS, OJCS, specified and unified commands, NSA, and DIA. MAC would also incorporate the current SAGA organization into its structure so as to permit a Service-independent analysis of regional and global strategies. MAC would then serve as independent military advisors to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense. The SECDEF would then have risk assessments, recommended priorities on resolution of shortfalls, and recommended allocation of resources being made on the basis of Service-independent analysis and advice, while retaining professional military judgment. In those cases where the JCS and the MAC would arrive at different recommendations/conclusions, the Secretary of Defense or the

President would be able to ascertain the biases from which the conflicting advice originated and make decisions accordingly.

This proposal does have limitations. The JCS/OJCS and the MAC will not be provided with the authority to direct the implementation of decisions, that authority will still be with the SECDEF and the President. Four additional four-star billets will be required, since the members of MAC will not be dual-hatted (as either Chief or Vice Chief of Service). And the quality of the advice rendered, as with all human endeavors, will be dependent upon the quality of the individuals involved.

While the MAC is but one possible solution to the current situation, a MAC will permit what is being sought--relevant, unbiased, professional military advice. This advice would be predicated on the capabilities and needs of the nation and its joint military forces and not on Service biases or perceived requirements to build force structure.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE: A CONCEPT
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That the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an organization whose effectiveness and efficiency has been in question for some time is a matter of historical record. The history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its supporting organization is replete, virtually from the very first days, with efforts to reorganize or to restructure it so as to increase the relevancy of its advice, improve its effectiveness, and to decrease the impact of the Service bias. General David Jones' recent testimony before Congress as to his desire, as an incumbent, to so structure the JCS as to attain those three objectives is the latest in a line of recommendations stretching back to before the actual passage of the National Security Act of 1947 with its establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense.

The Committee on Reorganization of National Defense, composed of two Army and two Navy officers, was formed and chartered to "make a detailed study and recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the most efficient practical organization of those parts of the executive branch of our government which are primarily concerned with national defense." (p. 1).^{*} In its report the Committee majority noted that "History forcibly indicates that as funds grow tighter and conflicting interests and personalities make themselves felt, agreements on major issues of policy, strategy and administration become difficult, if not impossible, to reach." (pp. 3-4).

^{*}Page references are taken from the text Chronology of JCS Organization Since World War II, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1980.

History is indeed repeating itself, as it frequently appears to do, when it has been ignored. When the Services become obsessed with one objective (Unconditional Surrender), when resources are virtually without limit (World War II), or when there is one predominant Service (the US Army in World War II), agreements on major issues, while not easy, are within reach. All three factors do not have to be present, only one will suffice, to bring about agreement. Since 1947, those periods of apparent agreement among the JCS coincide with the clear predominance of a single service--1950s saw the USAF and the strategy of Massive Retaliation in the driver's seat and the 1960s saw the conflict in SEA and the Army in the catbird seat. It is during these periods of less-than-clear superiority that the warning of the Special Committee comes back to haunt us.

So once again, a major proposal--at least the fifteenth*--will be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, or the President, or to Congress as to how to live with the lessons of history and avoid the results that come from ignoring same. As elaborated on in a meeting with reporters on 16 February 1982, General Jones is focusing on what he sees as the major shortcoming of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--their apparent inability to render sound, relevant military advice to the National Command Authority. A review of the major proposals and changes made since 1947, and an analysis of the chief complaints of today, does tend to narrow down to focusing on the ability of the JCS to serve as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

* * * * *

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, US Air Force; and the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, if there be one, are the principle [sic] military advisers to the President and to the Secretary of Defense. (p. 36)

*See Annex A for Summary of the 14 previous proposals.

The advice that is needed and desired is not always or even usually that of budgetary matters or of procurement--those Planning, Programming, and Budgeting matters are left to the Services, their Secretaries, the DOD Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The areas in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are found wanting--not only by external observers but also by their own admittance--are in matters of national military strategy, capabilities, and limitations--to include allocation of scarce resources. General Jones, the latest critic, focused on the inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide advice that is not service-biased, the inability of the JCS to take off their hats as Chief of Service and to give counsel that is not "turf" oriented, that is not focused on requirements but rather is based on capabilities. Principal advisers who can be counted on to repeat their service parochial viewpoint are not what is needed by a Chief Executive when decisions have to be made on the allocation of scarce resources or on the determination of national military priorities. And to date the history of the JCS has been that--to avoid split papers, the lowest common denominator, (or terminology that all four services can agree to) has been the matter of course. On this matter the Chiefs have been quite persistent in presenting a united and consistent (consistent with their individual service positions) front to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

It is most likely because of this history of compromise advice and positions consistent with Service bias that the current Secretary of Defense is establishing a separate body of national military advisers at the National Defense University--a body made up predominantly of civilians who (at least on the surface) do not have Service biases. Concurrently, within Congress there are a number of formal and informal groups that eventually may project themselves also as unbiased advisers on military matters. There is indeed a growing awareness that the JCS and its organization have a distinct inability to resolve ends-means mismatches

between strategy and resources. To adopt a global strategy, assuming simultaneity in two or more theaters, at a time of finite (possibly dwindling as well) resources requires the JCS to establish priorities of effort (as had to be done in World War II--Europe first) and allocation of resources. Lacking executive authority or command authority, coupled with the compromise approach that is characteristic of the JCS, the JCS finds itself either unwilling or unable to establish priorities or distribute scarce resources. Thus, the questions of simultaneity, risk assessment, global strategy, priorities, and resource (current capabilities) allocation are rarely raised to the Secretary of Defense or to the President. Yet these are indeed the matters of concern to the NCA that require the best possible military advice. It is for the result of these matters that the SECDEF has apparently formed his body of advisers at NDU, that Congress has formed various groups, and that General Jones desires to restructure the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These are also deep, controversial, and long-standing matters--cosmetic changes or tinkering with the system are not likely to effect a cure. However, completely radical changes to the structure could result in a situation where the cure is worse than the disease. Radical structure changes at a time of world and domestic economic and international political crises are not in the best interests of either the United States or its allies. Nor are they really in the best interest of its opponents--someone may underestimate or overestimate the speed or effectiveness of an American response and miscalculate our reply. Moderation would appear to be the key attribute of any shifts in structure or procedure. However, whatever shifts are considered, those selected must have a clearly defined end result prior to implementation so that those which have made the decision to change and those who are effecting the change know what

things will look like once the shift has been made. All too often changes are made without either the desired result being clearly enunciated or the end result being fully considered.

* * * * *

If one must repeat history when it is ignored, then perhaps history also possesses a solution to the problem at hand. As was observed, there are historical precedents to this current situation. Only in those instances where one or more of the conditions noted earlier--unanimity of objective, unlimited resources, or preeminent service--existed was the service bias subjugated. President Truman, one of the architects of the current organization, noted that in peacetime the JCS could not be expected to maintain the same high degree of coordination that it had during World War II. Similar to Marshall, he noted that as national defense appropriations grew tighter, and as conflicting interests made themselves felt in major issues of policy and strategy, unanimous agreements would become increasingly difficult to reach. Thus, the early organizers of the national defense structure, even during World War II, recognized the problem and attempted to design a framework that would permit sound military advice to be rendered to the civilian leaders. They established within the JCS a body known as the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to be the senior advisory body to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To quote the Special Historical Study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

As such, it [the Joint Strategic Survey Committee] gave advice on the following broad policy matters; questions of strategy and the relation of military strategy in the light of the developing and predictable situation, and in the light of long-range possibilities; and strategic possibilities to be considered when current plans had been executed or became impracticable. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee consisted of two Army general officers, one of them was from the Army ground forces, one of them was from the Army Air Forces, and one Navy flag officer, all assigned on a full time basis. (p. 2)

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) no longer exists; its purpose, functions, and capabilities having fallen prey to the practioners of Parkinson's Law and the Peter Principle. Since some of the reorganizations suggested by General Jones seem to fit into what the JSSC originally performed, it would be of value to trace the evolution and extinction of the JSSC and to explore the possibility of resurrecting such a structure today to assist in the provision of sound military advice to the National Command Authority.

* * * * *

As noted earlier, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) was formally established in 1943 as the senior advisory body to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And as such, the Committee functioned throughout the remainder of World War II. When the draft proposals of what became known as the National Security Act of 1947 surfaced, there were no objections to retain the JSSC as a body; in an effort to live within the original 100 man limitation of the JCS/OJCS, the Chief of Naval Operations proposed not only that it be excluded from that limitation but also that it be placed under the Director, JCS. On 22 October 1947, the JCS approved a strength of four men (2 Army, 2 Navy) but retained it directly under the JCS, as shown in Figure 1.

To participate with the JSSC on the matter of strategy and plans, a new player enters the stage--one who, as in a well-written drama, is originally innocuous but who also in the full context of the drama, is a major player--the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. This group was originally known as the Joint Staff Planners but on 31 October 1947, became a full fledged member of the Joint Staff under a committee designation.

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) grew in size--as opposed to the JSSC--in 1948, the JSPC could provide guidance to a Joint Strategic Plans Group, whose functions were to:

FIGURE 1



1. Prepare joint war plans and strategic studies and estimates on current military strategy and policy.
2. Prepare plans and studies and recommend policy on joint training, education, and organization.
3. Review strategic plans of unified commands.
4. Give strategic guidance to other agencies of the Joint Staff.
5. Recommend provisions for the strategic direction of military forces.
6. Coordinate with other Joint Staff agencies on plans and studies.

The Joint Strategic Plans Group was to receive guidance only from the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans Committee, the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, and the Director, Joint Staff. (p. 38)

On 1 April 1948, however, the size of the JSSC finally did change, from four to three--one each from the three services. In addition to changing its structure to accommodate the Air Force, the charter of JSSC also changed, reflecting the current peacetime situation. The JSSC was still the senior policy advisory group to the JCS and was to advise them in the following:

. . . over all strategy, and . . . relations between national security and national and international policy.

. . . broad military and politico-military policies, particularly those of concern to the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and to other departments and agencies of the Government.

. . . matters of military import in the United Nations.

The effect of new weapons on the conduct of war and national security.

During wartime, the committee would advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on two additional matters:

Military strategy . . . in the light of the developing and predictable situation, and in the light of long-range possibilities.

Strategic possibilities to be considered when current plans have either been executed or become impracticable. (p. 41)

In 1949, there was a new change for the Joint Strategic Plans Committee-- it grew to four members and was made responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (still through the Director of the JCS) for the following functions:

1. Recommend as to the requirement for, and the strategic direction and deployment of, US military forces.
2. Prepare strategic plans, studies, and estimates.
3. Formulate all major projects and plans for "optional operations" in the light of strategic plans, and for biological, psychological, and other types of unconventional warfare in areas of actual or projected military operations.
4. Recommend the establishment of unified and specified commands.
5. Formulate joint training policies.
6. Formulate strategic guidance for agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Military Establishment.
7. Review reports, studies, estimates, and plans of other agencies referred to them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (p. 52)

The growth of the JSPG/JSPC could be viewed as a professional response to the growth and complexity of the Cold War, or, in a more cynical vein, the growth could also be seen as a "test-tube" example of Parkinson's Laws on bureaucratic growth. The truth most likely lies in between these end points. But whatever the cause, the end results are a tremendous bureaucratic growth in the JSPG/JSPC arena.

By the end of 1950, the Joint Strategic Plans Group (JSPG) functioning under the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, had grown in size and in responsibilities. For example, on 1 December 1950, the JSPG was organized as follows:

War Plans Section (pp. 70-77)

<u>Team</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
Senior	Direction and review
Red	Mobilization planning; medium-range war plans to include NATO
White	Short-range war plans, to include NATO; troop deployment
Blue	Long-range war plans
Purple	Pacific Ocean area, Far East, and Southeast Asia
Grey	Western Hemisphere and continental US defense plans
Orange	Special supporting plans
Tan	Europe, Middle East, and Mediterranean

Policy, Training, and Organization Section

<u>Team</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
Senior	Direction and review
Gold	Command and organization; bases and base rights; JCS checklist for war
Silver	NATO (Policy, organization, and organizational matters)
Rainbow	Atomic energy; research and development; guided missiles; WSEG liaison; atomic supplements to war plans
Brown	Para-military
Green	Budget; Military Assistance
Bronze	Chemical, biological, and radiological warfare

And again in 1954, the JSPG increased its functional area of responsibility through the absorption of the functions of the Continental United States Defense Planning Group; this action was taken to give the JCS more direct control of continental defense planning.

By 1958, after being through a variety of changes and reorganizations imposed from the outside, and in compliance with President Eisenhower's wishes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertook a "J-Staff" internally-designed reorganization. This reorganization was not without trauma as the J-Staff (J-1, 2, 3, 4 as opposed to the then-existing committees and groups) was bitterly fought by the Navy Department. However, Public Law 85-599--known as the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958--was signed into law on 6 August 1958. As such, the JCS/OJCS structure shifted from Committees to conventionally numbered directorates. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee (one of the four surviving committees out of the original fourteen) was renamed the Joint Strategic Survey Council. Its Charter was also changed on 22 August 1958 to include the responsibility for advising the JCS on the effect of scientific and technological developments on national policy and national security.

With the reorganization of the OJCS into directorates, new charters were promulgated. On 1 January 1959, while losing operational aspects to the J3, the organization of the J5 included a Director for Plans and Policy. His mission was to provide the necessary assistance to the JCS (through the J5 and Director, JCS) for the preparation of joint strategic plans, current and future strategy, policy for unified and specified commanders; and recommendations on broad integrated research and development programs. The Director was assigned the following functions:

1. Prepare joint war and mobilization plans.
2. Recommend guidance to the military departments for the preparation of detailed service plans.
3. Review combined plans for military operations in conjunction with the armed forces of other nations.
4. Recommend the assignment, transfer, or abolition of functions of the armed forces.
5. Recommend joint training, education and organization policies.
6. Evaluate research and development requirements and programs of the military departments; recommend an integrated DOD research and development program.
7. Provide staff support for the Special Assistant for NSC Affairs.
8. Provide centralized staff direction for special plans and operations.
9. Recommend on strategic and politico-military matters requiring action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
10. Recommend concerning base rights needed to support joint plans.
11. Assist the Director for Operations in reviewing unified and specified command emergency, contingency, and operational plans. (pp. 143-4)

Once again, the new staff element increased in size and in number of responsibilities. Even losing the J3 functions, the J5 grew steadily, showing an apparent willingness to do even more.

In 1959, on the 23d of July, the growing similarity between the JSSC and the J5 became more pronounced with the addition of the following to the J5 charter:

Prepare as required for research and development matters, statements of broad strategic guidance to be used in the preparation of overall military requirements, statements of the relative military importance of development activities to meet the needs of commanders of unified and specified commands, and recommendations for the assignment of specific new weapons to the armed forces. (p. 153)

By 1962, life in the fast lane had become so complex that the Chairman of the JCS set up a permanent CJCS Special Studies Group (SSG) as an adjunct to his office. To avoid, no doubt, an increase in strength, the Director, J5, would serve as the chairman of this group. Twelve years later, the Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAGA) can trace its inception back to the CJCS SSG.

However, by the end of that year, General Taylor, as CJCS, directed the Director, Joint Staff to look at the relationship of the Joint Strategic Survey Council and the Special Studies Group. The value and worth of the JSSC, heretofore sacrosanct, was now being questioned. A group of three senior officers, whose function was to advise the JCS on matters of strategy was being overtaken by programmers, operations research/system analysts, and cost effectiveness. Yet the basic patterns of the JCS--the need for the language that all services could agree to (the "lowest common denominator" syndrome) and the interlocking relationship between the service staff that supported the Chief of Service also doubling as the staff that would support him as a member of the JCS--had not changed. Ironically, these patterns could be viewed as not hindering the counsel of the JSSC while these same patterns were part and parcel of the J5 and without a doubt affected its actions and advice.

On 15 March 1963, the JCS had decided to retain the Joint Strategic Survey Council. The Council had survived--for a while longer. However, by November of that year, the J5 had taken another quantum leap forward through the absorption of the Special Assistant for Programs and Budget--the J5 was now

to provide the single point of contact within the Joint Staff on the DOD Five-Year Force Structure and Finance Program. Coupled with this change was also the affirmation of the Chairmanship of the Special Studies Group.

The lease on life that the JSSC received in March of 1963 lasted 18 months; on 29 July 1964, the JCS agreed to disestablish the Joint Strategic Survey Council. By December, the J5 charter had been revised to include the following:

Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding matters of military import in the United Nations; advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military strategy in the light of the developing predictable situation; advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on strategic possibilities to be considered after current plans have been executed or become impracticable. (pp. 190-2)

During the next 10 years, from 1966 to 1976, J5 grew by leaps and bounds, in the process: absorbing programming and planning for the Five Year Defense Plan (1966); absorbing war gaming responsibility (1968), becoming a member of the National Security Council Review Group (1970); picking up portions of the J1 functional area (1976); and overall increasing the functional areas of responsibility to over 40 separate functions.

This growth did not go by unnoticed--since 1970, there have been a number of studies done on the JCS, largely by outside individuals and agencies who have noted the growth and have likewise noted the gradual demise of sound military advice and recommendations to the National Command Authority (Annex A). (Of increasing interest, now that heretofore restricted files are available to researchers, is the question of "why?" Why the growth of the J-5 and the stagnation of the JSSC? Was it a personality issue, or was it more task oriented--an increasingly larger staff for the J5 to handle the increasingly complex issues of unified command plans?) However, since 1958 there have been few, if any substantive changes in the organization and structure of the JCS. Those changes that have taken place were largely internal to the system and were in response to a rapid decrease in manning levels following the Viet Nam conflict.

Yet the need for sound military advice and recommendations continues unabated. Internal procedures, lowest common denominator syndrome, and the aforementioned relationship between the staffs all act as hinderances to the formulation and promulgation of such advice. Advice, military advice, is needed on questions of strategy and on the relation of military strategies to national strategy, particularly in view of competing national demands and finite national resources; and on questions of the relationships between national security and national and international policies. Aha, one says, I've seen those questions before! Those questions were once the purview of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, back during a simpler era. Perhaps the time has come to go back in history and to look at what did exist and to see how its principles might be converted to the current period.

In brief, the JSSC was composed of senior, experienced officers from all of the services; these officers had direct linkage with the group they advised; they had access to the necessary data and had all the potential of being able to arrive at an independent analysis and recommendation. If opinions were ever split, the body to whom they were providing the advice had the responsibility and the authority to make the decision as to whose advice to accept and whose to reject.

The development of another "Joint Strategic Survey Committee" today may be a solution to the current situation, particularly if the principles noted above are adhered to in the formulation and use of such a group. The following recommendation constitutes such a body and is shown in Figure 2.

The Military Advisory Council (MAC) is in addition to the current defense structure. The MAC would consist of four senior officers, one from each service, the four star level. They would not be dual-hatted (i.e., serving also as Vice Chief) and would go on to retirement from their tour on the MAC. They would

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advise the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President on those matters as outlined above. They also would have direct access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified and Specified Commands. The MAC would also incorporate the current SAGA into its structure so as to permit an independent (from service staff and service bias) analysis of global and regional strategies. Such appraisals as the Operation Plan Package Appraisal (OPPA) and the Total Force Capabilities Analysis (TFCA) would be run by the MAC and its analytical staff. Operational shortfalls would be known to the MAC through the Unified Commands and appropriate risk assessments could then be made and the results provided to the decisionmaking authorities. Thus, risk assessments, establishment of priorities, and allocation of resources would be made on the basis of service-independent analysis and advice while retaining professional military judgment. The role of J5 would be reduced to that of an integrator of staff and command work in relation to planning, primarily deliberate planning.

There are definite negative aspects of this proposal as well. While not requiring legislative action, neither does this proposal make any movement to providing the JCS/OJCS with executive authority. While the MAC may advise the Secretary of Defense on the allocation of resources, and the CJCS might agree with such an allocation, neither the Chairman of the JCS, the OJCS, nor the MAC would have the authority to direct such an allocation, only the Secretary would be able to do so. And the Secretary of Defense would have to closely supervise the execution of such a reallocation so as to preclude the individual Services from stonewalling. Such a MAC would require four additional O-10 billets, a subject which would bring close Congressional attention. While the members of MAC would serve at the desire of the President and with the consent of the Senate, a system of checks and balances would have to be instituted that would

prevent abuse of the system or its members. And, finally as with all human endeavors, the quality of the MAC advice is directly dependent upon the quality of the humans involved.

* * * * *

In summary, the resurrection of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee with its role as principal advisor to the National Command authority is but one possible solution to the current situation. Such a body does permit what is being sought, unbiased, professional military advice--at a limited cost in personnel (four O-10 billets, the remainder of the staff coming from J5, J3, and SAGA) and reorganization turbulence. Opposition to such a structure would be expected to be intense since under MAC, as recommended, there would be no closets to hide skeletons in, no avoidance of appraisals that could prove to be damaging in terms of roles, missions, and functions, and no chance to divide and conquer. Operational commands would have access to decisionmakers and the ability of the services to equip, train, and maintain forces to accomplish a coherent, global strategy under the worst possible conditions would receive close, careful scrutiny. And advice to the President by the Military Advisory Council would be predicated on the capabilities and the needs of the nation and its joint military forces, not service bias or perceived requirements.

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ANNEX A

<u>Commonly Recognized Title of Proposal</u>	<u>Desired Action</u>	<u>Origin</u>	<u>Major Result (if any)</u>
National Security Act of 1947	To Establish DOD/NCA Structure	External to DOD/JCS	The Formation of the Defense Department
Organization and Functions of Joint Staff, 1947	To Define the Organiza- tion and Functions of JCS	Internal - JCS	Initial Structure of JCS
Key West Agreement, 1948	To Establish the Approved Functions of JCS	External to DOD/JCS	Confirmed JCS Structure and Functions
Amendments, 1949 (Hoover Commission, Eberstadt Committee)	To Strengthen the Secre- tary of Defense to Create the Position of the Chairman, JCS	External to DOD/JCS	Centralization of Authority in the Secretary of Defense
PL 416, 1952	Granted Coequal Status to Commandant, USMC	External to DOD/JCS	Established the CMC as Member of JCS
Reorganization Plan #6 (Rockefeller Report, 1953)	To Remove JCS from Unified/Specified Com- mand Chain; To Provide More Authority to CJCS	External to DOD/JCS	To Bring the JCS in Line as "Advisors" Only
Director, JCS, 1957	To Centralize OJCS Functions	Internal - JCS	Internal OJCS Changes
Reorganization Act of 1958	To Return JCS to Unified/ Specified Chain of Com- mand; To Provide More Authority to JCS	External to DOD/JCS	Creation of J-Staff (J-1, J-2, etc.) in Lieu of the Original Directorates and Committees
General Lemnitzer's Proposal, 1962	To Increase the Size of the Joint Staff; Reduce Span of Responsibility of CJCS	Internal - JCS	Creation of OPSDEPS
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 1970	To Create an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operations and to Deemphasize the Role of the JCS	External to DOD/JCS	Only Limited Internal Changes Within OJCS
Steadman Report, 1978	To Emphasize Resource Allocation for Unified/ Specified Commands	External to DOD/JCS	Only Limited Internal Changes Within OJCS
Ignatius Report, 1978	To Focus on Realigning DOD Structure with Limited Attention to JCS	External to DOD/JCS	Limited Changes Within DOD; None in JCS
Rice Report, 1979 (Defense Resource Management Study)	To Develop and Implement Defenses Resources Board	External to DOD/JCS	Creation of Defense Resources Board
Odeen Report, 1979	To Focus on Decisionmaking Management Activities; However, Generally Above JCS Level	External to DOD/JCS	None Within JCS

Summary of JCS/OJCS Organization Proposals, 1947-1979

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This special report notes those characteristics of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which critics have stated are the key driving factors behind their calls for reform. Key among those characteristics is the apparent inability of the JCS to render sound relevant military advice to the National Command Authority. The author contends that during World War II and for a short period of time thereafter, the JCS was highly regarded for its advice on military strategy and affairs. The principal council which provided a counterbalance (CONT'D)		

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BLOCK 20. ABSTRACT (CONTINUED):

to the advice generated from the Services was the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC). The author then traces the gradual decline of the JSSC and the concurrent growth of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, which, under subsequent reorganization became known as the J5. The author asserts that with the current legislative mood, coupled with the stated desires of General Jones (Chairman, JCS) and General Meyer (Chief of Staff, Army) to reorganize the JCS, a relook at the JSSC is in order. The author also believes that a rebirth of the JSSC would permit sound professional military advice to be rendered to the President, military advice that would be predicated on the capabilities and the needs of the nation and its joint military forces, not on Service bias or perceived requirements.



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